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BOOK REVIEW
LIFE, DEATH, AND PUBLIC POLICY
Larry I. Palmerf
IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES:

CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOM-

PuBLic PoLIcy. By Neil K. Komesar.+ Chicago: University of
Chicago Press. 1994. 287 pp. $34.95.
ics, AND

In the public's mind, "legal scholarship," like "legal advice," is
perhaps an oxymoron. In the latter, the listener often hears predictions about the possible outcomes of an arcane adjudicative process
far removed from the personal decisions that led to the need for professional advice. In the former, most legal scholars assume prominent
roles for judges and adjudicative processes. In reality, the courts are,
at best, distant influences on the lives of most individuals. Legal scholars quickly embrace the mantle of interdisciplinary (or more accurately, multidisciplinary) approaches when discussing particular
public policy issues. Nonetheless, most interdisciplinary legal scholars
start with adjudicative processes (after all, that is what we teach in law
schools) as the core of their analyses. As a result, scholars assume that
courts are the central decision makers in diverse public policy debates, such as how new reproductive technology should be used,' or
whether medical technology should be used to end the lives of certain
2
patients.
Komesar offers a conceptual framework for resolving public policy dilemmas-"comparative institutional analysis."3 Forget simplistic
notions of public policy making that assume political processes are
always better than adjudicative processes in resolving policy dilemmas.
t Professor of Law, Cornell University. A.B. Harvard University; LL.B. Yale University. I acknowledge the assistance of Roberta Armstrong, Davydd Greenwood, and Suzy
Szasz, all of whom were kind enough to read and comment on earlier drafts of this piece. I
wish to thank Marcie A. Finlay, a second year student at the Cornell Law School, for her
able assistance on the foomotes.
I Komesar is the James E. and Ruth B. Doyle-Bascom Professor of Law at the University of Wisconsin, Madison.
1 See gmerallyJoHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUcrrVE TECHNOLOGIES (1994) (citing codes and statutes throughout the book).
See RONALD DwOR~rN, IaFE'S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANA2
SIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 179-217 (1993).
NEIL 1. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES:
3
NOMICS, AND PUBLIC POuCY 3-13 (1994).
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Do not expect to find that market forces are always superior simply
because Komesar is trained as both an economist and a lawyer.
Rather, Komesar proposes that deciding whether the market, the
political process, or the adjudicative process should resolve a question
is the very essence of public policy making. His conceptual framework
assumes that the choice is often opting for the least harmful institution, rather than aspiring for the best process to address the question.4 As a result, Neil Komesar's book is refreshingly different from
most legal scholarship.
I suggest that Komesar's framework is especially important to
those who see legal scholarship at its best as informed by the tensions
between the practical and the theoretical. When we speak about issues of public policy, we must remember we are simply citizen-scholars, not experts or high priests of law, economics, philosophy,
medicine, or science. 5 Komesar's work reminds us that the views of
those who type our manuscripts or check out our groceries, as well as
those who sit in offices in federal court houses, are participants in the
formulation of public policy.
In Part I, I will summarize Komesar's mandate for institutional
analysis with a discussion of his views on market forces, legislation,
and the court system. Part II applies Komesar's framework to the
problem of physician-assisted suicide. Part III applies Komesar's principles to in vitro fertilization decisions. With these examples, I conclude that Komesar has provided scholars and institutional players
with a profound method for approaching such difficult questions of
public policy.
I
SCHOLARS,

PUBLIC POLICY,

INTERPRETATION:

AND CONSTITUTIONAL

KoMESAR's

FRAMEwoRK

Komesar structures his book in a manner that helps the reader
understand his conceptualization of the scholarship on public policy
and law. Proposition One, for instance, which is argued throughout
the book, states "[t] he choice of social goals or values is insufficient to
4 A trio of scholars working in the area of family law have proposed that the legislative goal should be "the least detrimental alternative." JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN Er AL., BEYOND
THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 53 (1979). While this approach was developed in a field
seemingly far removed from the major focus of Komesar's book, it is generally applicable.
I will demonstrate how the Komesar framework can be used to fi-ame the question for
reproductive technology. See infra notes 73-93 and accompanying text.
5 See generally Larry I. Palmer, The High Priests Questioned or at Least Cross-Examined, 5
Rutr.-CAM. L.J. 237 (1974) (commenting on JAY KATz Er AL., EXPERIMENTATION WITH
HuMAN BEINGS: THE AUTHORrrY OF THE INVESTIGATOR, SUBJECT, PROFESSIONS, AND STATE IN

THE HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION PROCESS (1972)); Joseph Goldstein, PsychoanalysisandJurispudence, 77 YALE L.J. 1053, 1060 (1968) (emphasizing the limited contribution psychoanalysis can make to jurisprudence).
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tell us anything about law and public policy either descriptively or prescriptively. One must seriously consider institutional choice in order
to understand or reform law and public policy."6 Proposition Two
urges that institutional analysis should be a methodology of comparing alternative institutions, not simply a critique of the imperfections
of courts, the markets, or the political processes. 7 And finally, Proposition Three urges that institutional analysis "should be participationcentered,"8 a modification of the interest group theory of politics
widely embraced in many disciplines, including constitutional theory. 9
These themes are pervasive throughout the text.
In his second chapter, Komesar introduces the reader to the most
persistent problem in public policy analysis: the confusion of social
goals such as efficiency of resource allocation or protection of "fundamental rights" with public policy analysis. 1° There is abundant discourse in modern legal scholarship about "rights" as the central idea
of legal theory," but as Komesar points out, "[c]alling something a
2
'right' is an institutional statement."'
For Komesar, the essence of public policy analysis is "institutional
choice": deciding which of several institutional processes within lawadjudicative, administrative, or legislative-should be given the authority to decide a particular issue. But "the market," namely the reality of what people do, is also an institutional process to be considered
within any analysis of public policy. Thus, considering the limitations
of law in any of its forms to change particular kinds of human behavior is an aspect of comparative institutional analysis.
The work of Nobel Prize-winning economist Ronald Coase provides the conceptual foundation for Komesar's book. Komesar argues,
however, that most economic analyses of law have misinterpreted the
meaning of the famous Coase Theorem-that it does not matter
which rule of property rights is chosen by law in terms of efficient
allocation of resources, if one assumes no transaction costs. 13 Ironically, in Komesar's view, for a world with imperfect institutions,
6
7

KOMESAR, supra note 3, at 271.
Id.

8 Id. at 272.
9 Komesar cites a number of leading constitutional scholars who rely upon interestgroup analysis, e.g., Epstein and Cherminsky. Id. at 216 n.38.
1O Id. at 14-50.
11 Komesar centers his attack on the Rawisian conception ofjustice that secures basic
liberties for each person and provides for social and economic equality. For a complete
treatment of this theory, seeJom RAw,.s, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).

sura note 3, at 43.
Id. at 29. Komesar makes the point about property rule, but I believe the implications of the Coase Theorem apply to liability rules as well. See LARRY I. PALMER, LAW,
MEDICINE, AND SOCLALJUSTICE 14-15 (1989). Komesar develops this linkage to Coase, initially discussed in Part I of the book, in later portions of his text. See KOMESAR, supranote 3,
at 61-62, 109-12.
12

13

KOMESAR,
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Coase's work, when properly understood, makes the institutional arrangements within law very important for public policy.
Komesar thus criticizes the scholarship of law-and-economics
types, public choice theorists, philosophers, and constitutional theorists for either assuming that institutional arrangements in a society
are irrelevant, or for confining their analyses to only one institution. 14
He demonstrates convincingly that comparative institutional analysis
is a powerful tool for understanding a wide range of public policy issues-pollution, tort reform, and First Amendment jurisprudence.
His methodology is a participant-centered approach to the political
process, the market, and the courts. Komesar begins his participantcentered analysis with the political process, that messy and supposedly
irrational process that annoys many legal policy scholars.' 5 He describes the economic based "interest group theory of politics"
("IGTP") and IGTP's critics. The latter view the assumption that public officials are motivated solely by narrow self-interest as simply a variation on "the proverbial economic person," 16 where the incentives are
campaign contributions and maintaining oneself in office.
Komesar details the shortcomings of both IGTP scholars and critics and proposes a two-force model of IGTP. He recognizes that special interest groups with high stakes in a particular outcome are
participants in legislative decisions, but so are indifferent voters, legislators, their staff members, and committees.' 7 He uses Coase's work
to demonstrate that these institutional actors have various degrees of
access to information that could lead to either majoritarian or minoritarian biases in legislation.' 8 To explain this aspect of the real
world, Komesar proposes that we analyze legislation with regard to
particular issues-in other words, treat the political process as an institutional process. 19
In his detailed arguments, Komesar urges courts, particularly the
United States Supreme Court, to engage in careful analysis of
problems legislatures have addressed before declaring themselves to
be the appropriate institutions to correct minoritarian bias in political
and market processes. 20 An economic analysis of law is important, not
14 At one level, the list of scholars appears to be a "Who's Who" of modem legal and
public policy scholarship-John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, Richard Posner, John Ely, Guido
Calabresi, and James Buchanan. In addition to the usual index, there is a very helpful
author index in the book. KOMESAR, supra note 3, at 277-79. Komesar focuses his critical
analysis on the most prominent authors listed above.
15 Id. at 53-97.
16
Id. at 53.
17
18

Id. at 65-75.

Id. at 61-62.
19 Id. at 53-97.
20 When a court is asked to consider, for instance, if legislation that purports to protect the public from "false" or "misleading" advertising by pharmacies is constitutional, it is
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for the purpose of ignoring the political or adjudicative processes, but
for the purpose of choosing market processes when they are the least
21
harmful alternative.
But when Komesar turns his analysis to courts, the darlings of
legal scholars, it is apparent that comparative institutional analysis
yields some surprising results. While he agrees that judges in this
country have more independence than legislators, he points out that
there is a cost: judges have less direct information from the numerous
participants about great social concerns. 22 Furthermore, he points
out that the high barriers to entry into the court system, including
jurisdictional requirements and the expense of litigation, make courts
less certain about the effects of their decisions on the masses. 23 Moreover, even if claimants succeed in having their day in court, there is a
"skewed distribution of stakes," particularly in class actions, where majority interests are often undercompensated. 24 There is no single litmus test of the soundness of legislation that courts can use, according
to Komesar, because judges and juries are "aloof."2 5 According to
Komesar, this aloofness is the product of a judicial system which isolates the judge and jury from public opinion and elections, and which
provides information through the distorting lens of the adversary
26
system.
Komesar suggests that courts may be performing the correct institutional role in declaring unconstitutional recent tort reform legisla2 7 If the
tion such as damage caps on awards in malpractice cases.
public policy issue is conceived of as promoting the optimal or appropriate level of health and safety, much of the current tort reform
movement is a case of severe political malfunction. 28 In other words,
a court can rightly decide that it has the institutional capacity to declare that individual adjudication of claims after the fact is the appropriate public policy, particularly when the costs of prevention cannot
appropriate for courts to recognize that this particular attempt at regulation of the market
for goods and services imposes numerous transaction costs on consumers. This protection
of "commercial spee6h," for Komesar, is best understood as an instance where courts are
the corrective for the political process' restrictions on the information flow in this particular market for goods and services. Id. at 120 & n.30.
21 Id. at 98-122.
22 Id. at 123.
23
Id. at 125-28.
24 Id. at 130-34.
25 Id. at 141.
26
Id. at 141.
27
Id. at 193-95. While Komesar specifically states he does not decide this issue, id. at
195, his discussion of how judges can serve to correct political malfunction leads one to
believe he implies that the courts' role is proper.
28
Id. at 193-94.
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be distributed in a fair and efficient manner through a combination
29
of market and political processes.
Komesar further sees the drafting of constitutions as a problem of
choosing the deeper institutional design of a given society. 30 He criticizes many current theorists, including John Ely,3 ' for ignoring the
complexity of the political process as an institutional process. For
Komesar, the corrective for a political malfunction-or any other institutional malfunction-is not simply a matter of whether one trusts
or distrusts the current, past, or future political process: "In the complex world of institutional choice, foxes might be assigned to guard
the chicken coop where the alternatives (bears, weasels, and so forth)
32
are worse."
Komesar's critique of the scholarship on the appropriate role of
judicial review of legislation is deft. He points out that the expansive
notion of the role of the judiciary in protecting property rights under
a new substantive economic due process theory is an institutional illusion.3 3 He takes both the fundamental rights theorists and their opponents (the proponents of strict adherence to the original intent of
the framers) to task for their non-institutional view of constitutional
adjudication.3 4 Through this analysis, he places Ronald Dworkin, a
35 and Supreme Court Justice Scalia,
"fundamental rights" scholar,
an
36
"original intent" theorist,

in the same non-institutional camp.3 7

Komesar argues against any such overarching theory of judicial review, since the role of the judiciary is determined after a comparative
institutional analysis, not before such analysis is undertaken.3 8
29

I was particularly impressed with how Komesar takes on the media and political

perception that there is "too much" litigation and carefully analyzes the claims of various
participants and the available data. Id. at 153-95.
30

Id. at 196-231.

Id. at 204-05.
Id. at 204.
33 Id. at 233-50. Komesar critiques Richard Epstein's neo-Lockean libertarian views as
expressed in his book, RIciARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN (1985). KOMESAR, supranote 3, at 238-56.
34
Constitutional theorists who use public choice theories to describe the process of
the making of our own constitution come into Komesar's critique for assuming that the
making of the Constitution was simply a way to overcome special interest groups in the
legislative process. These theorists ignore the possibility of majoritarian bias in the political process. KOMESAR, supra note 3, at 216-21.
35 Id. at 261 n.40. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978)
(applying Dworkin's theory of rights to judicial decision-making).
36 KOMESAR, supra note 3, at 265 n.46.
37 Id. at 256 ("Each of these approaches seems to offer a way to short-circuit all the
messiness and ambiguity of institutional choice."); see also id. at 255-65 (discussion of the
two non-institutional approaches).
38
Id. at 270.
31

32
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II
CREATING ONE'S OWN DEATH: KOMESAR'S INSTITUTIONAL
APPROACH V. DWORKIN'S FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

Komesar is critiquing and attempting to change non-institutional
analyses of public policy, and he suggests that the reader do the same.
I accept this invitation by examining the approach taken to physicianassisted suicide. I will analyze the issue using the process suggested by
Komesar-one which requires a great deal more than an analysis of
the Court's opinions.
Ronald Dworkin's recent book, Life's Dominion:An Argument About
Abortion, Euthanasia,and IndividualFreedom,3 9 presents several analyses
of the adjudicative principles of courts. Dworkin poses the question,
"Do Americans have a constitutionalright to die?"4° and answers it in
the affirmative. Dworkin's non-institutional analysis of public policy is
exactly what Komesar wants us to question. My own institutional analysis leads me to ask an alternative question: Is the United States
Supreme Court, rather than the market or political processes, the appropriate institution for handling the range of issues surrounding the
termination of medical care?
If we think about the market process and the political process
surrounding terminating care, Dworkin's analysis is defective. His failure is manifest by the way he discusses the public referendum in
Washington and California in 1991 and 1992 over physician-assisted
suicide.41 Dworkin argues that in both situations, a small minority, an
interest group with what Komesar would call "minoritarian bias" or
high stakes 42 in the outcome, overwhelmed the apparent will of an
otherwise indifferent or uninformed majority.43 Dworkin's concern
about the supposed misuse of the political process by special interest
groups, such as the Catholic church, is an argument that the political
process has malfunctioned in terms of failing to act in accordance
with the polity's deepest principles. 44
39
40
41
42
43

DwoRN, supra note 2.
Id. at 181.
Id. at 179-217.
See supranotes 10-12 and accompanying text; KoMES.AR, supra note 3, at 54-58.
Dworkin notes at the beginning of his book:

In 1991, the voters of Washington State narrowly defeated a referendum
bill that would have legalized euthanasia there, and in 1992 similar legislation was defeated in California. In both cases it was expected, well before
the election, that the bill would pass, but groups opposing euthanasia, including the Catholic church, waged bitter and effective campaigns, spending far more than the groups supporting it.
DwoRKwN, supra note 2, at 4. Komesar does not deal explicitly with the institution of
medicine directly in his book. I believe, however, that the institutional analysis is implicit
in his discussion of malpractice. See KoMEsAR, supranote 3, at 158-61.
44 In the literature on law and economics this is often referred to as "rent-seeking."
See KoMEsAR, supra note 3, at 55 n.3.
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Dworkin deals with the Catholic church and other interest groups
by creating the "rational person" whose principles about abortion and
euthanasia can be connected to what Dworkin sees as the public policy issue. He concludes that: "[s] ome of the political groups that opposed the euthanasia initiatives in Washington and California sensed
a connection between permissiveness about euthanasia and a liberal
attitude toward abortion." 45 Any reading of a current newspaper will
indicate that the political rhetoric of our day combines issues in this
way, but Dworkin does not explain why a body engaging in serious
public policy making, such as the United States Supreme Court,
should see the two issues as connected.
To make his argument in favor of a constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide, Dworkin provides a non-institutional interpretation of the major United States Supreme Court case on terminating
care. In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health,4 6 the Court
upheld the constitutionality of the Missouri statutory scheme for removing food and nutrients from an unconscious patient in a persistent vegetative state. For Dworkin, the important part about Cruzan
was that the "Court seemed to recognize, at least in principle, that
states must honor living wills." 4 7 For Dworkin, this created the neces-

sary connection to the value of "autonomy" and the Court's decisions
on abortion. For an institutionalist, however, Cruzan contains three
different institutional questions posed by the three opinions of the
Justices in the majority.
Justice Rehnquist, whose position Dworkin criticizes as "conservative," 48 is explicit in Cruzan about what the question involved:
"Whether Cruzan has a right under the United States Constitution
which would require the hospital to withdraw life-sustaining treatment
under these circumstances." 49 He specifically stated that the attempt
by Cruzan's guardians to state the question in terms of her alleged
constitutional right of privacy or autonomy was inappropriate: "The
difficulty with petitioners' claim is that in a sense it begs the question:
An incompetent person is not able to make an informed and voluntary choice to exercise a hypothetical right to refuse treatment or any
other right."5 0
Justice Scalia, whose opinion Dworkin also criticizes, 51 asked a different question: Whether the Constitution forbids a state from adopting legislation that seeks to prevent an individual from killing him or
45
46
47
48
49
50
51

DwoRmN, supra note 2, at 194.
497 U.S. 261, 281 (1990).
DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 181.
Id. at 214.
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269.
Id. at 280.
DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 194-95, 198.
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herself.5 2 His question, and thus his opinion, that the statutory
scheme was constitutional, is a declaration of the Court's institutional
incompetence to deal with the so-called "right to die" issue. 53
Justice O'Connor, ignored by Dworkin, wrote a separate opinion
"to emphasize that the Court does not today decide the issue whether
a State must also give effect to the decisions of a surrogate decision
maker. '54 Although she is not nearly as explicit as Rehnquist as to the
precise question for her in the case, one might wonder if her concurrence indicates a difficulty with Rehnquist's formulation of the question or his particular answer to the question.
It would be heresy for Dworkin or his followers to suggest that
Justice Rehnquist in Cruzan addresses an institutional question involving a decision about how the Court should use its resources. Despite
the similarity in values at stake in abortion and terminating care, analyzing the problems institutionally might lead the Court to treat these
two public policy problems distinctly. The Court might treat the two
issues differently because the various Justices might see dissimilar institutional choices presented.
Physician-assisted suicide would come to the Court in the context
of its prior decision in Cruzan. A piece of legislation like the one at
issue in Cruzan would be viewed as an attempt to regulate an important social institution, medicine, along with the many actors in that
process. The Court might view the political process and the market
process as adequate to protect physicians from the legal risks stemming from difficult ethical questions. These processes could help discriminate the circumstances under which a doctor could terminate a
patient's care or could take active steps to end a "patient's" life from
those under which a doctor could not do so.55 On the other hand,
legislation aimed at abortion control seeks to regulate the formation
52

Although his opinion in Crumn makes many references to his view that the lack of

mention of a right to suicide in the text of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution decided for him the issue presented, his question, along
with his underlying judicial philosophy, allows him to suggest that he and his eight colleagues are no more competent to rule on the issue than "nine people picked at random
from the Kansas City telephone directory." Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 293 (ScaliaJ., concurring).
53 This is not to deny that there is a connection between Scalia's theory about the
Court's role in abortion and in terminating care, as he has consistently stated that the
Court should remove itself from the abortion issue by overruling Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973).
54 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 289.
55 One could argue that courts have interpreted the criminal law to make its use difficult in ethically complex situations. In Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (Ct.
App. 1983), the California court established a very difficult standard for even indicting
physicians for murder when there was some evidence that the doctors may have ended life
support too soon. The Court reasoned that the action of removing life support was an
'omission," and therefore, there was no violation of the physician's duty to the patient as a
matter of law. Id. at 493. See PALMER, supra note 13, at 100-05.
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of families, an area in which fundamental societal choices are made.
The Court's conflicting abortion opinions are better read as conflicting views of the Court's institutional role in making public policy on
family formation rather than merely as decisions reflecting individual
Justices' "political decisions" or views on the propriety and morality of
abortion.
Justice O'Connor's recent opinion in Casey v. Planned
Parenthood,5 6 for instance, rejected a legislative requirement that a
woman notify her husband prior to an abortion.5 7 The Court, however, upheld the legislative provisions requiring a twenty-four hour
waiting period,58 as well as provisions requiring physicians to give the
woman information about fetal development as part of the consent
process. 59 In so doing, Justice O'Connor centered her analysis of
abortion not on medicine as an institution, but rather on the degree
to which the political process could restrict the decision-making authority of individual women. As to the Pennsylvania legislature's requirement that the physician provide information about the fetus to a
woman, she stated:
Whatever constitutional status the doctor-patient relation may
have as a general matter, in the present context it is derivative of the
woman's position. The doctor-patient relation does not underlie or
override the two more general rights under which the abortion
right isjustified: the right to make family decisions and the right to
physical autonomy. On its own, the doctor-patient relation here is
entitled to the same solicitude it receives in other contexts. Thus, a
requirement that a doctor give a woman certain information as part
of obtaining her consent to an abortion is, for constitutional purposes, no different from a requirement that a doctor
give certain
60
specific information about any medical procedure.
Justice O'Connor's views on the political process in regard to
abortion are better illustrated by her concurrence in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 61 where she joined the Court's decision uphold-

ing a state statute declaring that fetal life begins at conception. As an
institutional actor, Justice O'Connor is subject to many influences
when she attempts to resolve a legal dispute, but the most important
are her institutional choices reflected in her own opinions. It is a mis56

112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).

57

Id. at 2830.

Id. at 2823.
Id. at 2791.
Id. at 2824. O'Connor's opinion makes it clear that the provision for spousal notification is unconstitutional because it was not a regulation of the obligation between a
woman and her husband regarding children, but rather of the decision to terminate her
pregnancy. Id. at 2829-30.
61 492 U.S. 490, 522 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
58

59
60
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take, in my view, to assume, as Dworkin does, that how Justice
O'Connor decides cases is determined solely by her values or her
search for an overarching definition of "liberty."62 How she decides a
constitutional question involving physician-assisted suicide may be
framed by her views of the Court's role in the difficult public policy
63
issue of abortion.
Dworkin's views on physician-assisted suicide are driven by his
views on abortion. To make the link between his analysis and doctrines within constitutional theory, he concludes that there is a "right
of procreative autonomy" which is grounded in the First Amendment's prohibition against the establishment of religion and guarantee of the free exercise of religion.6 4 For Dworkin, the timing of our
individual deaths is a question of the ultimate meaning or sacredness
of life in some religious sense. He endorses the theory ofJustice Stevens that statutes restricting abortion violate the First Amendment. 65
Thus, the doctrines developed in abortion cases should influence the
doctrines developed for physician-assisted suicide.
Dworkin does not, however, acknowledge that shifting the doctrinal basis for the right to an abortion or the "right to die" from "liberty" or "privacy" to the First Amendment would require another
more complex type of institutional analysis: the state's relation to religion as an institution. 66 This area is murky because the Court and its
scholarly critics have not fully recognized school prayer, financial support for religious schools, or moments of silence as attempts to find
67
the appropriate institutional balance between the state and religion.
DwouuN, supra note 2, at 126.
Predicting how she would decide a constitutional case involving physician-assisted
suicide is risky without attention to more of her opinions in related cases. Dworkin is
critical of the twenty-four hour waiting period, based on his views of the impact on the
autonomy of some women. DwoRIN, supra note 2, at 153, 173-74. He does not consider
that this decision is part of a theory of the legislative/adjudicative interaction thatJustice
O'Connor and her colleagues are attempting to develop having decided not to overrule
Roe- In my view, the Court, notwithstanding Professor Dworkin's contrary opinion, no
longer relies upon the theory that the fetus is not a person tojustify its opinion.
64 DwoRaIN, supra note 2, at 160. Dworkin also notes that the right of procreative
autonomy "follows from any competent interpretation of the due process clause...." Id.
However, he chooses to focus on the First Amendment arguments.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 160-61.
67
My own evolving analysis of institutions, admittedly confined to the "law and
medicine" field has been to suggest that different modes of analysis should be applied to
public and private institutions. Religion and the family are private institutions, where the
institutional job for courts is to try to protect those institutions from the majoritarian political decisions. I suggest that an appeal to "values" does not increase our capacity to think
about the hard institutional choices we face in a religiously diverse society in which much
of the public discourse in scholarship is informed by secularism and the media discourse
by television evangelism. We should, therefore, acknowledge the power of both kinds of
participants in the development of the public policy that will eventually affect people's
lives.
62

63
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In contrast, Dworkin apparently believes that the Court could resolve
its Establishment Clause controversy by delineating what features
make a conviction a "religious belief rather than a nonreligious moral
principle or a personal preference. ' 68 Dworkin, like many modern
scholars, fails to appreciate that at its core, religion is a matter of practice and experience, not simply a matter of cognitive belief.
Unlike Dworkin, I believe the Justices of the Court develop theories of institutions which assume that all institutions are imperfect.
The lack of clarity found in the Court's decisions on the death penalty, for instance, should be seen as hesitant first steps toward establishing the Court's role vis-A-vis the criminal law process. The Justices
might have different theories about how discretion ought to be structured and about the legislative role in that process. 69 Not surprisingly,
in my view, the various Justices might also have different theories
about the Court's role in shaping public policy toward abortion.
I address Dworkin in detail here, in part because his analysis of
the abortion opinions and of the issues of physician-assisted suicide
have already had enormous influence. A federal district court in the
State of Washington implicitly accepted Dworkin's reasoning in declaring the state's criminal statute prohibiting assisted suicide unconstitutional as applied to physicians of competent terminally ill
patients.7 0 A New York physician, Dr. Timothy Quill, 7 1 with the assistance of the Washington-based non-profit group involved in filing the
Washington lawsuit, has filed suit in federal court seeking to have New
York's law against assisting suicide declared unconstitutional. 72 Dr.
Jack Kevorkian 73 has filed suit in California to force that state to restore his license to practice medicine on the ground that its law
against assisting suicide is unconstitutional. 74 To date, no non-profit
68 DWORIuN, supra note 2, at 161-62.
69 1 must confess that I abandoned an earlier attempt to analyze theJustices' opinions
over a wide variety of cases as a way of getting us away from the liberal-conservative thinking about the Court. See Larry I. Palmer, Two Perspectives on StructuringDiscretion: Justices
Stewart and White on the Death Penalty, 70J. GluM. L.& CRIMINOLOGY 194 (1979).
70 Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994)
(relying on similarity between reproductive rights and physician-assisted suicide), rev'd, 49
F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd, No. 94-35534, 1996 WL 94848 (Mar. 6, 1996).
71
See TIMoTHY E. QUILL, DEATH AND DiGNrr. MAXING CHOICES AND TAKING CHARGE
(1993); Timothy E. Quill, Risk Taking by Physicians in Legally Gray Areas, 57 ABAYw L.REV.
693 (1994).
72 Quill v. Koppel, 870 F. Supp. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (upholding New York's law against
assisting suicide).
73 Although well known in the media as "Dr. Death," Kevorkian considers himself a
scholar on medical ethics. His early work, CapitalPunishmentor Capital Gain, 50J. CRiM. L.,
CRMrNOLOGY & POLICE Sca. 50 (1959), involved experimentation on prisoners and provides the conceptual foundation for his book, PRESCIUPTON MEDICIDE: THE GOODNESS OF
PLANNED DEATH (1991), in which he presents an argument about ethics.
74 A motion to dismiss by the State was argued in January 1995, but there has as yet
been no decision in the case. See Kevorkian Wants State's Suspension Order Lifted, He Also
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public interest groups have joined with Dr. Kevorkian's assertion of
freedom.
For Dworkin and the so-called medical ethicists like Dr. Quill,
medicine is not a complex institution, but only a forum for discussing
the physician-patient power dyad in relationship to constitutional
principles. Dworkin purports to write a book for use in public policy
resolutions, and expresses surprise in the preface to the paperback
edition of his book that he did not provide enough guidance for a
legislative committee in Great Britain considering modification of its
law regarding terminating care. 75 Perhaps the legislative process cannot hear Dworkin's voice because he does not speak a variety of institutional languages. Dworkin assumes that the political process
malfunctions whenever a fundamental right is implicated or legislators fail to seriously consider the value of liberty. It does not occur to
Dworkin that perhaps the manner in which present laws on living wills
are drafted might actually reflect physician interest. His argument
reduces itself to the following question: If a woman has a constitutional right to an abortion, does the Constitution provide a patient
with a terminal illness a constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide?7 6 Professor Dworkin answers "yes" and suggests that there
should be a mechanism by which we can end our lives by agreement.
However, Dworkin's approach is based on a non-institutional analysis
of medicine and is grounded in his premise that the "good life" must
be an autonomous life.

III
CREArING LiFE: A CASE OF INSTITUTIONAL INCOMPETENCE
Yet another series of antitheses to Komesar's book is presented in
the "rights" view of regulating reproductive technologies. These theorists find an easily identifiable way of regulating reproductive technologies: resolve the value conflicts. Professor John A. Robertson, who
builds on Dworkin's work 77 in his recently published, Children of
Choice: Freedom and the New Reproductive Technologies7 8 states:
Challenged Califomia Assisted Suicide Ban, SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 9, 1994, at B9 (appealing

suspension of medical license on state law and constitutional grounds); State Asks Judge to
Throw Out Kevorkian Lawsui SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 11, 1995, at B4 (Motion to Dismiss

argued and taken under consideration).
75
DwoRmIN, supra note 2, at xiii.
76 Oregon has become the first state to accept physician-assisted suicide in a statewide
referendum. Immediately after the statute went into effect, it was challenged as a violation
of constitutional notions of equal protection. A preliminary injunction against enforcement was issued in Lee v. State, 869 F. Supp. 1491 (D. Or. 1994).
77
See Ronald Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should be Overrded,
59 U. Cm. L. REv. 381 (1992).
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ROBERTSON, supra note 1.
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The goal of this book is to show the importance of procreative
liberty, the freedom to decide whether or not to have offspring, in
devising the framework for resolving the controversies that reproductive technology creates. It views the issues presented by reproductive technology as first and foremost a question of the scope and

limits of procreative freedom, and assesses reproductive technolo79
gies in that light.
The organizational structure of his discussion of in vitro fertilization illustrates that his overall perspective of value analysis generates
very different questions from those an institutionalist would ask. After
presenting his readers with the "facts" of infertility and the technological process of in vitro fertilization, Robertson asks a normative question: "Should it be done at all?"8 Robertson's answer is negative.
After describing the biological and moral status of embryos, 8 ' Robertson turns to the legal issues and asks: "Do embryos have legal
rights?"8 2 Once again, his answer is no. This allows him to deal with
other issues of control and disposition of embryos, concluding with
praise for the Tennessee Supreme Court's decision in a divorce action
declaring that an ex-wife had no right to donate frozen embryos over
the objection of her ex-husband.8 3 Although Robertson goes on to
discuss what he calls "consumer protection issues," 8 4 my focus is on
demonstrating how different his questions and methods of analyses
are from an institutional analysis of the legal and public policy questions surrounding in vitro fertilization.
An institutionalist would first look at the market process of in vitro
"firtfli~tHn
"lho- ,rlr-t
micrht be defined a tho
indiviuiua whn
choose to have children with the assistance of medical professionals
through the use of in vitro fertilization. An institutionalist with legal
training might resist his or her instincts to assume the "facts" of how
these persons and professionals found each other and deal with institutional facts that are readily available.
The institutionalist would hypothesize that individuals who engage in "family formation" activities with the assistance of infertility
"experts" have managed to work out arrangements that make the so79

80
81
82

Id. at 3-4.

Id. at 99.
Id. at 100-08.
Id. at 103.
83
Id. at 113-14. Robertson's praise is directed at Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 60203 (Tenn. 1992) where the court suggested that there ought to be an agreement about
what happens to embryos in case of divorce. Whether the court is correct that there
should be a pre-implantation agreement about embryo disposition in the event of divorce
is a highly debatable proposition, not to be dealt with here. See Larry I. Palmer, Who Are the
Parents of Biotechnological Children?, 35JuumaETxRcsJ. 17 (1994).
84 ROBERTSON, supra note 1, at 114 ("questions of safety, efficacy, and access raise...
important policy issues").
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cial, economic, moral, and legal risks worth taking for them personally-but not, perhaps, for the entire society. An institutionalist would
consider that using technology to overcome infertility has occurred
before with the use of artificial insemination.8 5 There were some legal
disputes that arose from the use of this technology and eventually
some legislation in the 1970s. Before deciding if courts or legislatures
are the primary policy makers, the institutionalist would ask a more
general initial question: From the perspective of law, are artificial in86
semination and in vitro fertilization similar processes?
In institutional analysis, following Komesar's lead, we ask the policy questions from the perspective of the institution that is the least
harmful alternative for answering the question. My question, for instance, assumes that people are using in vitro fertilization. The question further assumes that without Professor Robertson's erudite
analysis, some of the participants in the assisted-reproduction process
are aware of differing ethical views of the appropriateness of using in
vitro fertilization. Most important, the question assumes that a complete legal prohibition of the use of in vitro fertilization in our complex society is simply not possible.
In my view, both courts and the political process are relatively
incompetent at preventing wealthy individuals with sufficient interest
in gaining access to physicians and reproductive technologies from
doing so.8 7 This would argue for a minimalist role for both courts and
legislatures as compared to what I rather loosely will call "market
forces."8 8
85 Robertson mentions artificial insemination in his introduction, but does not draw
any institutional lessons from this experience. Interestingly, he does mention that "due to
discriminatory access to the medicalized system of sperm procurement, an unknown
amount of AI occurs outside doctors offices with privately procured sperm and self-administration via turkey basters and syringes." ROBERTSON, supra note 1, at 8 (citing Daniel J.
Wilder & NormaJ. Wilder, Turkey Baster Babies: The Demedicializaiton of Artificial Insemination, 69 MiLBANK Q. 5 (1991)).

See Palmer, supranote 83.
Robertson indicates in his preface that his attention was drawn to the subject of in
vitro fertilization in 1984, when he saw a newspaper headline that read: "Test Tube Orphans: Frozen Embryos Might Inherit $8Million Fortune." "The story was about a wealthy
American couple who had died in a plane crash with frozen embryos in storage in Australia." ROBERTSON, supranote 1, preface ix.
88 At least one court agrees with my statement:
We do not underestimate the difficulties of legislating on this subject. In
addition to the inevitable confrontation with the ethical and moral issues
involved, there is the question of the wisdom and effectiveness of regulating
a matter so private, yet of such public interest. Legislative consideration of
surrogacy may also provide the opportunity to begin to focus on the overall
implications of the new reproductive biotechnology-in vitro fertilization,
preservation of sperms and eggs, embryo implantation and the like. The
problem is how to enjoy the benefits of the technology-especially for infertile couples-while minimizing the risk of abuse. The problem can be
86

87
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The analytical process involved in drafting legislation to deal -with
in vitro fertilization, for instance, would have to take seriously the
claims of special interest groups, such as those with religious objections to the use of new reproductive technologies. These deeply felt
values cannot be supplanted by an appeal to the values held by a heuristic reasonable woman or man, as suggested by Professor Dworkin's
approach to physician-assisted suicide. In this process, court cases are
institutional lessons rather than clear directives about whose "rights"
are superior.
Believers in "procreative liberty," like Professor Robertson, are
uneasy with an institutional unwillingness to define rights, since for
Robertson defining rights answers the public policy questions. Thus,
Robertson believes it is unconstitutional for a court to refuse to enforce an agreement to relinquish all claims to parental status pursuant
to a surrogate parent agreement.8 9 The institutionalist might look at
some practices, such as "gestational surrogacy," and generate questions for legislatures rather than for courts. An institutionalist uses
answers to previous institutional questions when analyzing new situations such as the practice of couples attempting to hire another
woman to carry their embryo to term. If the legislature were to make
the institutional decision to treat artificial insemination and in vitro
fertilization in a similar fashion, the practice of gestational surrogacy
generates a new question.
"Is gestation legally significant?" This institutional question arises
because separating gestation from fertilization for women is now
clearly possible. If the legislature were to answer the question in the
affirmative and also decide that the genetic contribution of a woman
arguably made her a parent, the possibility of two mothers would arise
in the eyes of the law.90 A legislature attempting to resolve whether
genetic mothers or gestational mothers should be the mother for
legal purposes might not come up with a definitive answer.
The New York legislature recently passed the Surrogate Parenting
Contract Act which established a "public policy" and an institutional
mechanism for carrying out that policy. The second section of the law
declares surrogate parenting contracts, as later defined, void and unaddressed only when society decides what its values and objectives are in
this troubling, yet promising, area.
In the Matter of Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1264 (1988).
89 He states: "The procreative liberty of both infertile couples and surrogates would
be advanced by upholding preconception agreements for surrogate services. If the parties
have a constitutional right to use non-coital means of forming families, that right should
include enforcement of preconception surrogate contracts." ROBERTSON, supra note 1, at
131.
90 See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993). Elsewhere, I have suggested
that the Calvert opinion is an insufficient analysis of the alternatives the legislature is actually faced with by the use of this technology. See Palmer, supra note 83, at 24-26.
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enforceable because they are "against public policy."9 1 When it came
to delineating how courts should resolve disputes, the legislature was
less than definitive. It only told courts not to "consider the birth
mother's participating in the surrogate parenting contract as adverse
to her parental rights, status, or obligations." 92 As to the genetic
mother, the statute is silent as to her possible claims, although she is
recognized as a potential disputant.93 This possible compromise in
the political process does not demonstrate the incompetence of the
94
legislature, but perhaps its sensitivity to the depth of claims before it.
As a declaration of public policy, the New York Surrogate Parenting
Contract Act is only a structure for decision-making by lawyers, physicians, and private persons.95
The refusal to deal with Robertson's normative question of considering a total ban on the use of in vitro fertilization highlights the
difference between an institutionalist's and a rights analyst's approach
to public policy issues of new reproductive technology. The institution of the family in all of its forms-single teenage mothers, married
couples with their biological children, single men or women with their
adopted or biological children, couples with children born with the
assistance of reproductive technologies-is an important aspect of
maintaining democratic values over the longhaul. As such, the most
important function of law, in relationship to the family as a private
institution, is to protect it from the state.9 6 This simply means that
both courts and legislatures should carefully analyze their institutional
incompetence in the face of basic human desires before enacting statutes or deciding cases. In particular, the answer from either courts or
91
92
93

94

N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 122 (Consol. Supp. 1994).
Id. § 124(1).
Id. § 124.

As I stated in another connection:
All claims-of those who contribute genetic materials (men and women) to creating children as well as of those who provide gestational
birth-are equally powerful and entitled to respect in the legislative process.

Put more bluntly, when it comes to deeply intimate matters such as

the meaning of our lives and our connection to the future through those
we call 'children,' I believe the legislature can provide only a structure, and
perhaps some incentives or disincentives....
Larry I. Palmer, A Rejoinder, 35 JuIuMETxcs J. 51, 53 (1994).

95 It is worth noting that the only persons subject to a criminal penalty under the New
York Statute are those who take fees for their services in connection with surrogate arrangements more than once. Brokers who are found to have violated the specific prohibitions of offering brokerage services for a fee are guilty of a felony if previously convicted of
violating the prohibitions. N.Y. Dom. RrL. LAw § 128(2) (b) (Consol. Supp. 1994). On the
other hand, the private parties-including the birth mother and genetic mother-are only
subject to a civil penalty of up to $500 for violating the statute. Id. § 123(2) (a).
96 Komesar agrees with the broad proposition that law in the form of legislation or
judicial pronouncements is used to protect people from the will of the majority. KoMESAR,
supra note 3, at 227-31.
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legislatures, after careful analysis of market behavior, might be "I
don't know." This institutional analysis ironically leads to the result
that the legislative process contributes to the public policy process by
clarifying the nature of our uncertainty.
CONCLUSION

The foregoing institutional analyses were prompted by a committed reading of Komesar's book. His thesis makes us more aware of the
possibility that what passes for social analysis of a problem, particularly
when the issue is something like "protecting the value of autonomy,"
is based on the premise that some institutional process is faulty.
Komesar instructs us, as scholars looking at social issues, to be careful
to define them in terms of institutions, for example, family formation,
rather than in terms of a particular social goal, such as procreative
liberty. He further urges us to consider law as an institutional process
with limitations, so that we can refine and sharpen its use for the ultimate social good. From the perspective of comparative institutional
analysis, Komesar cautions us that even for problems as complex as
how children should be born and how and when individuals should
die, "we need to assess the efficacy of alternative strategies for protec97
tion against minoritarian or majoritarian bias."
Let me suggest that Komesar's analysis should make us question
not only the implicit choice of courts as an institution in Professor
Robertson's analysis, but perhaps also lead us towards the question of
whether any legal regulation is desirable. I maintain that Komesar's
approach makes it possible to seriously consider doing nothing, or at
least doing very little. Issues of how children should be "formed" and
when life should end include issues about individual spiritual meaning, issues often ignored in most forms of modern legal scholarship.
My analysis of Komesar's book suggests that legal scholars should
take existing institutions seriously, not for the purpose of maintaining
the same institutional structures, but for the purpose of providing
analyses of those institutional arrangements that will help policy makers resolve dilemmas in a marginally better way. My criticism of Dworkin's and Robertson's approaches to public policy demonstrates how
much legal scholarship focuses on courts, while ignoring other institutional alternatives.
If we consider our comparative advantages, legal scholarship has
a considerable contribution to make to the larger knowledge enterprise that is under both internal and external examination. If we look
at what we do in providing professional training for future practitioners, government officials,judges, legislators, and even business manag97

KoMEsAR, supra note 3, at 226-27.
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ers, we have the opportunity of being scholars who live within the
intricacies and uncertainties of the practical and the theoretical. Not
only in our teaching do we need to make the conflicts between the
two more visible, but also in our scholarship. We must deal more explicitly with the questions institutional participants, such as Supreme
Court Justices, ask and the questions we ask ourselves.
Komesar makes one weary of the economists' self-serving person, 98 the public values of Dworkin's rational person, 99 and Robertson's bioethical person as primary modes of analysis of any public
policy problem.' 0 0 Komesar's scholarship does not treat the motivation of individual actors as determinative. He focuses on the complexities of human institutions.
Until we start a meaningful dialogue among ourselves about how
our teaching, scholarship, and public service fit into some type of
whole, our thinking will be lacking in systematic approaches to the
complex institutional concerns faced by our society. The legal scholar
purporting to deal with a public policy issue must confront the fact
that law is a complex institution interacting with other equally complex institutional arrangements in society.
By engaging us in comparative institutional analysis, Komesar
forces us to deal with the dynamic complexity of institutions in mass
societies. He does a masterful job of comparing the market, the political process, and the adjudicative process within the framework of particular problems. I have analyzed the institutions of medicine and
family. I suggest that we need to pay more attention to analysis of the
legislative process in legal scholarship and teaching. When I criticize
the manner in which Professor Dworkin fails to deal with the doctrinal
analysis of "liberty" in the various opinions in Cruzan,'0 1 I am suggesting that we must deal with the detailed analysis of particular institutions, such as our United States Supreme Court, before presenting
policy makers with guidance for complex policy processes.
Such a careful, detailed analysis by legal scholars is important because those we teach are in the process of developing their own
frames of reference for professional practice. When our students become law clerks, judges, partners in law firms, and mothers and fathers asking school officials about their children's education, they will
be speaking from a frame of reference about the world that we can
marginally influence by the ways in which we teach and practice our
craft of scholarship.
98

99
100
101

See supra notes
See supra notes
See supranotes
See supra notes

13-21 and accompanying text.

34-37 and accompanying text.
78-96 and accompanying text.
66-76 and accompanying text.
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Neil Komesar is both a good scholar and a good writer, and his
message is clear: think hard about the institutional arrangements already in place by analyzing those institutions. Articulate the social
goals, and distinguish them from public policy issues which are, in
Komesar's view, institutional choices. If we engage in the careful analysis Komesar suggests, we will be privileged to be participants in the
process of trying to be of service to the larger global society by careful
analysis of its many complex and fragile institutions. Remember that
the quality of our individual lives depends upon the humaneness of
the institutional arrangements in which we live. 10 2 This is, in essence,
the real purpose of legal scholarship.

102
Komesar describes the complexities of modem life in the opening paragraph of his
book. KOMESAR, supranote 3, at 3. See also Larry I. Palmer, Good People, Bad Institutions
(1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).

